The Memorial Day Massacre (Part I)

Didn't anybody out there learn anything last year?

True, what the Celtics accomplished offensively yesterday afternoon was so extreme in scope that all rational thinkers realize it cannot possibly happen again (to wit: Scott Wedman probably won't go 11 for 11 again before his next life), but do not assume the method of Celtic attack was accidental. The Celtics planted all the right offensive seeds. They just didn't know they would wind up with the Sequoia National Park in two hours.

The key to the 148-114 debacle at the Garden was the intelligent, poised Celtics offense. Tapes of this game should be distributed to every college and high school coach in America for careful perusal. There will be no more detailed destruction of an opponents' defense available for several years. "They did everything they wanted to, according to their game plan," said Los Angeles assistant coach Dave Wohl.

The Celtics simply applied the lessons they learned in last year's finals. Think back. In Game 1 they were destroyed by LA's transition game. They did win Game 2, but it was a massive struggle, and it would not have been possible without James Worthy's boo-boo late in regulation. Then came the third game, the 137-104 massacre in the Forum. Boston looked pitiful offensively.

Game 4 was the pivotal game. At some point in the third quarter of Game 4 the Celtics realized that as long as they kept throwing up quick shots they would be susceptible to the Laker fast break. The only chance they would have against this younger, quicker, more physically gifted team would be to use their heads. And so they began throwing the Extra Pass.

Look it up. In the third quarter of Game 4 Gerald Henderson and Dennis johnson began making open jump shots. Why? Because they were open. They were open because they were staying one step ahead of the LA defensive rotation. LA's defense, like the Washington, New York and Milwaukee defenses, was predicated on doubling down on such inside threats as Robert Parish and Kevin McHale. This would leave other men open, but in the first 3 1/2 games of that series, the Celtics failed to exploit the situation, mainly because the guards weren't moving the ball properly.

Once the Celtics committed themselves to the Extra Pass, they were in control of the series. They won Game 4 and Game 5, handed away Game 6, and won Game 7 easily.

Now, welcome to 1985. The Lakers still must concentrate on doubling up on the Boston big men, for the very simple reason that none of their primary big people can guard any of the Celtics individually. Kareem Abdul-Jabbar might have a chance against Robert Parish, but no Laker forward can guard Kevin McHale unaided and no Laker forward whose name is not Michael Cooper can guard Larry Bird. The Lakers can't change; it's that simple. What they must hope for is that none of the Boston guards can hit the open jumper from 15 to 20 feet. However, Danny Ainge and Dennis Johnson have hit that shot all season long. We all know Bird can hit that shot. And all of North America now knows Scott Wedman can hit that shot.

"If they hit their pull-up jumpers on the break," said Wohl, "and then they hit their jumpers out of the double-team, nobody can defense that. Now, all season long they've been pretty good from that 17- to 18-foot range, but in this game they were hitting from 20 to 22 feet and three-point range. Then they become an impossible team to defend."

No team can maintain a 61 percent shooting average at this level. Scott Wedman won't go 11 for 11 again, including 4 for 4 on three-pointers. But Danny Ainge has had games like this one (9 of 15), and Dennis Johnson can shoot better (only 6 of 14 overall). What is LA to do?

There was a great deal of talk about Boston's sensational outside shooting, but the fact is that the Celtics did early damage in other, basic ways. By the time it was 16-10 and LA had called its first timeout, the Celtics had only hit one outside shot. Having established themselves inside offensively and having established their own running game via some brilliant defense, they started kicking the ball back out and working it around the horn to the open man, who happened to be Ainge.

By the time Wedman hit his first bomb they were leading by 52-29. His points were gravy points, not primary points. The Celtics were tormenting the Lakers with a classic inside-out offensive game, and it all began with the fact that the Lakers are terrified at the thought of leaving Abdul-Jabbar, James Worthy, Kurt Rambis or Bob McAdoo alone against Messrs. Parish, Bird or McHale.

Now there is no denying that the Celtics shot exceptionally, almost blissfully, well from the outside. But let the record show that just as the Celtics only scored two of their first 16 points of the first quarter from the outside, so, too, did they only score two of their first 16 in the second quarter from the outside (a Ray Williams fast break pull-up jumper). By the time they hit their second outside shot of the second quarter (Wedman's first jumper at 52-29), they had gained nine points over the one-quarter spread.

To use a boxing metaphor, it was only after softening up the Lakers in the body that they attacked the head. Boston's approach was icily professional.

"They use a scrambling defense relying on Kareem and double-teaming," said Celtics assistant Chris Ford. "They want to make you rush your jump shot. They key was our patience. We didn't just make the second or third pass. We made the fourth or even fifth pass. Their defense broke down."

This is precisely what they did to win the title last year. Wasn't anybody paying attention? What happened was that a guy like Wedman went crazy, escalating a rout into an annihilation. The truth is that even if he went 5 for 11, or 1 for 11, they were going to win, anyway, because their basic smart basketball provided more than enough ammunition to do the job.